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WAIVER OF JURY TRIALS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: A
REASSESSMENT OF THE "PROSECUTORIAL VETO"
INTRODUCTION
The jury trial guarantee' carefully guards the constitutional rights
of the accused.2 Nonetheless, in certain circumstances, a jury might be
"positively detrimental to the defendant. '3 Jurors may be prejudiced
against the defendant by massive pretrial publicity, 4 the particularly
heinous nature of the crime charged,- or by characteristics of the
defendant such as race, religion or prior criminal record. 6 Voir dire
1. The defendant in a criminal prosecution has a constitutional right to a trial
by jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .. "). The right to
a trial by jury, however, does not extend to "petty offences." Schick v. United States,
195 U.S. 65, 68 (1904); see 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 371, at 294
(2d ed. 1982). The sixth amendment right to a jury trial has been incorporated in the
fourteenth amendment, and thus must be provided by the states. Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
The defendant in a federal prosecution also has the right to procedural due
process, guaranteed by the fifth amendment. U.S. Const. amend. V; see L. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law § 10-7, at 501-02 (1978). States must also provide
procedural due process. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally L. Tribe, supra,
§ 10.7, at 501-02 (discussion of scope of fourteenth amendment right to due process).
The Supreme Court has stated that "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). If the
defendant's request to waive his right to a jury trial is denied and the ensuing trial is
unfair, the defendant's right to due process will have been violated. See Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). In analyzing whether a denial of a requested
waiver would violate the defendant's right to due process, this Note refers to the
defendant's right to a fair trial.
2. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 155-56 (1968); Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 721 (1961). See generally 5 J. Moore, Federal Practice 38.02, at 38-14
to 38-15 (2d ed. 1982) (discussion of the role of the jury in our justice system).
3. Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury In Criminal Cases, 25 Mich. L. Rev.
695, 696 (1927).
4. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Ceja, 451 F.2d 399, 400 (1st Cir. 1971) (per
curiam) (ethnic prejudice); State v. Kilburn, 304 Minn. 217, 232-33, 231 N.W.2d 61,
69 (1975) (Otis, J., dissenting) (racial prejudice); Brief for Appellant at 25-27, United
States v. Moon, No. 82-1275 (2d Cir.) (religious prejudice); Comment, Jury Trial in
Minnesota-Right or Obligation?, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 759, 762-63 (1976) (arguing that
a defendant should have an absolute right to waive his jury trial right in situations
involving inherent racial bias); 26 Ill. L. Rev. 85, 85-86 (1931) (jury prejudice based
on "race, color and religion"). Many waivers have been requested on the basis that
disclosure of the defendant's prior criminal record would prejudice the jury against
the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Farries, 459 F.2d 1057, 1061 (3d Cir. 1972)
(inherent nature of crime charged, instigation of prison riot, indicated that defend-
ant was convicted felon), cert. denied at 409 U.S. 888 (1972) and at 410 U.S. 912
(1973); United States v. Harris, 314 F. Supp. 437, 437 (D. Minn. 1970) (long
1091
1092 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
has proven to be an ineffective means of rooting out all juror bias.7
Moreover, the factual and legal intricacies of a particular case may
render a jury incapable of providing a fair trial." A jury trial may also
impose inordinate time and expense for both the defendant and the
public. 9 Consequently, a defendant should be permitted to waive his
right to a jury trial in certain situations.
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCP)
provides that "[c]ases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried
unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval
of the court and the consent of the government."' 1 In upholding the
criminal record, including conviction for manslaughter; also, defendant was wanted
in other states for same type of crime as in principal case); United States v. Schipani,
44 F.R.D. 461, 462-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (waiver granted to avoid prejudicial effect of
disclosing defendant's prior criminal record), aff'd on other grounds, 414 F.2d 1262
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970). Physical and mental problems of
the defendant may also prejudice the jury. See United States v. Harris, 314 F. Supp.
437, 437 (D. Minn. 1970) (drug addiction); State v. Linder, 304 N.W.2d 902, 904
(Minn. 1981) (paranoid schizophrenia).
7. Donnelly, The Defendant's Right to Waive Jury Trial In Criminal Cases, 9
U. Fla. L. Rev. 247, 248 (1956); Note, Government Consent to Waiver of Jury Trial
Under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 65 Yale L.J. 1032,
1037 (1956) [herinafter cited as Government Consent to Waiver]. See infra notes 36-
43 and accompanying text.
8. United States v. Braunstein, 474 F. Supp. 1, 14 (D.N.J. 1979); see Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 188-89 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v.
Panteleakis, 422 F. Supp. 247, 249 (D.R.I. 1976). See infra notes 21-22 and accom-
panying text. In complex federal civil cases, many courts have held that a party is not
entitled to a jury trial, based on different rationales. In Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S.
531 (1970), the Supreme Court stated in a footnote that in determining whether an
action is legal or equitable, "the practical abilities and limitations of juries" should be
considered. Id. at 538 n.10. It follows from this footnote that complexity may render
a case equitable, making the seventh amendment right to a jury trial inapplicable.
See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 67-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). For a
discussion of the proper weight to be afforded the Ross footnote, see C. Wright, The
Law of Federal Courts § 92, at 614-16 (4th ed. 1983). In In re Japanese Elec. Prod.
Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980), the court ruled that due process
objections to a jury trial must be weighed against the seventh amendment right to a
jury trial of the party requesting it. Id. at 1086. A commentator has suggested that
the seventh amendment right to a jury trial should not apply to complex civil cases.
See Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70
F.R.D. 199, 207-09 (1976). But see In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411,
431 (9th Cir. 1979) (no complexity exception to seventh amendment right to jury
trial), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980); Kian v. Mirro Aluminum Co., 88 F.R.D.
351 passim (E.D. Mich. 1980) (same).
9. See infra notes 89-94, 115-20 and accompanying text.
10. Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a). Many states also require consent of the prosecutor
and the court. See Note, Criminal Jury Trials in Iowa: A Time for Revision, 31
Drake L. Rev. 187, 208-14 app. (1981) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Jury Trials in
Iowa]; see, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 35-37-1-2 (Burns Supp. 1982); Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 1.13 (Vernon 1977); Wis. Stat. Ann § 972.02 (West 1971 & Supp.
1982). Many states have adopted a less restrictive approach than the federal rule. See
Criminal Jury Trials in Iowa, supra, at 208-14 app. (survey of state rules for jury trial
WAIVER OF JURY TRIALS
validity of this Rule in Singer v. United States," the Supreme Court
rejected the claim that the defendant has a right to a trial before a
judge.' 2 Additionally, the Court, relying on the integrity of the prose-
cutor as a "servant of the law," did not require the prosecutor to
articulate his reasons for withholding consent to a defendant's re-
quested waiver. 13
The Court did note, however, that in some situations "a defendant's
reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone [might be] so compel-
ling that the Government's insistence on trial by jury would result in
the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial."' 4 Most lower federal
courts have interpreted this dicta as allowing a court' 5 to override a
waivers). Some states permit the defendant to choose between a bench and jury trial.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-406 (1973) (defendant has absolute right to waive except in
capital cases); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-82 (1981) (defendant has absolute right to
waive; three-judge panel will try cases involving a possible death penalty or life
sentence); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, 103-6 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (only requirement is that
the defendant "understandingly" waive jury trial in open court); La. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 780 (West 1981) (defendant has absolute right to waive in non-capital
cases if knowingly and intelligently made); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 763.3 (West
1982) (absolute right to waive, must be in writing except in minor offenses); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 606:7 (1974) (defendant has absolute right to waive in non-capital
cases if in writing and if any other defendants also waive before jury is impaneled);
Iowa R. Grim. P. 16.1 (defendant has absolute right to waive provided he does so
within thirty days of arraignment; thereafter, consent of the prosecutor is required);
Md. R. Grim. P. 735 (defendant has absolute right to waive any time before trial if
knowingly and voluntarily made); Ohio R. Grim. P. 23 (defendant has absolute right
to waive if intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily made before trial; thereafter
consent of court and prosecutor is required). Additionally, many other states make
waiver contingent solely on court approval. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 806-61 (1976); N.Y.
Grim. Proc. Law § 320.10 (McKinney 1982); Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.001(2) (1981); Me.
R. Crim. P. 23(a); Mass. R. Grim. P. 19; Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01(2); Mo. R. Crim.
P. 27.01(b). Pennsylvania requires that waivers be approved by the defendant's
attorney as well as by the court, and that waivers be knowingly and intelligently
made. Penn. R. Crim. P. 1101. Nebraska, by case law, has adopted a court-only
approval standard. See State v. Godfrey, 155 N.W.2d 438, 442-43 (Neb.), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 937 (1968). For a discussion of the varying degrees of discretion
afforded courts in deciding whether to approve a requested waiver, see infra pt.
III(B).
11. 380 U.S. 24, 37 (1965).
12. Id. at 26, 34-35.
13. Id. at 37. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
14. 380 U.S. at 37. The American Bar Association adopted the requirement of
prosecutorial consent to jury waivers. 3 Standards for Criminal Justice 15-1.2 (2d ed.
1980) [hereinafter cited as 3 ABA Standards]. See generally id. commentary at
15" 16-15.23 (discussion of arguments for and against requiring prosecutorial consent
to waivers of a jury trial).
15. The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (Supp. V 1981),
amended the Magistrates Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1976), by expanding the
jurisdiction of magistrates from petty offenses to misdemeanors, and by authorizing
magistrates to conduct jury trials. Id. Prior to this amendment, many defendants
would choose not to be tried by a magistrate because the right to trial by jury had to
be waived. See S. Rep. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6, reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code
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prosecutor's withholding of consent only if forcing a jury trial upon
the defendant would result in a denial of his right to a fair trial."6
Moreover, these courts have held the defendant to a high standard in
proving that his constitutional right would be violated.' 7 Because
defendants have rarely been able to meet the stringent burdens of
proof, the prosecutor has essentially been granted a veto power.' 8
Part I of this Note argues that requiring the defendant to show
concrete evidence that a jury would be unfair impermissibly endan-
gers his constitutional right to a fair trial. Rather, a court should
override the prosecutor's "veto" of a waiver whenever the defendant
shows a reasonable likelihood that an impartial jury could not be
impaneled. Part II examines the genesis of Rule 23(a) and concludes
that it was not intended to be applied in its present, rigid form. After
analyzing the rationales offered for the prosecutorial veto, this Note
argues that the veto power should be eliminated. Part III examines
alternative standards to strike a proper balance between the interests
of the defendant and the prosecutor. Finally, in Part IV, this Note
proposes an approach that permits the flexibility that all the federal
criminal rules were designed to ensure.
I. PROTECTION OF THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
A. Jury Prejudice or Inability to Understand Complex Issues
A defendant in a criminal case may request to waive his right to a
jury trial because he believes a jury would be prejudiced against him.
The inability of a jury to provide a fair trial may occur for various
reasons. For example, a jury can be affected by adverse pretrial
Cong. & Ad. News 1496; McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 Harv. J.
on Leg. 343, 391 (1979).
16. E.g., United States v. Ceja, 451 F.2d 399, 401-02 (1st Cir. 1971); United
States v. Harris, 314 F. Supp. 437, 439 (D. Minn. 1970); United States v. Daniels,
282 F. Supp. 360, 361 (N.D. Ill. 1968). See supra note 1.
17. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
18. There have been only three reported cases in which the defendant was able to
override the prosecutorial "veto." United States v. Braunstein, 474 F. Supp. 1, 12-14
(D.N.J. 1979) (complex issues creating high risk of prejudice and would result in
ordinate delay and expense if trial was by jury); United States v. Panteleakis, 422 F.
Supp. 247, 248-50 (D.R.I. 1976) (waiver granted over prosecutor's objection because
issues of law and accounting were complex, multiple defendants created a substantial
risk of attributing evidence applicable to only one defendant to other defendants, and
articles in local newspapers were inflammatory and prejudicial); United States v.
Schipani, 44 F.R.D. 461, 463-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (waiver granted over objection of
prosecutor, who had originally consented to waiver; prejudice may have resulted
from disclosure of defendant's financial history and prior criminal record, which
created a danger of linking the defendant with organized crime), aff'd on other
grounds, 414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
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publicity.1" One state rule specifically requires the judge to grant a
waiver "if there is reason to believe that as a result of the dissemina-
tion of potentially prejudicial material, the waiver is required to
assure the likelihood of a fair trial.12 0 The defendant's right to a fair
trial may also be threatened by forcing a jury upon him if the correct
resolution of a case requires command of a difficult subject matter
beyond the knowledge of the average layman.2 1 Even with the guid-
ance of experts, the jury may be incapable of rendering a fair and
reasoned verdict.2 2 Furthermore, if the defendant is charged with a
19. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961). Waivers of jury trials have often been requested on grounds of pretrial
publicity. E.g., United States v. Wright, 491 F.2d 942, 945 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 862 (1974); United States v. Panteleakis, 422 F. Supp. 247, 249 (D.R.I.
1976); United States v. Daniels, 282 F. Supp. 360, 361 (N.D. Ill. 1968). One
commentator has contended that the increased difficulties in finding a fair and
impartial jury due to the dissemination of prejudicial news articles are an unavoid-
able by-product of a society that abhors censorship of the press. 26 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
867, 868 (1965); accord Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729-30 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). The Supreme Court has stated, however, that "the mere existence of
any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more,"
id. at 723, is not sufficient to render a juror partial "if the juror can lay aside his
impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court."
Id. See generally Note, Copying and Broadcasting Video and Audio Tape Evidence:
A Threat to the Fair Trial Right, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 551, 562-66 (1982) (discussion
of impact of excessive publicity on the defendant's right to a fair trial).
20. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01(1)(2)(b). The waiver must be knowingly and volun-
tarily made. Id.
21. United States v. Braunstein, 474 F. Supp. 1, 13-14 (D.N.J. 1979); see Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 188-89 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The mere fact that
a case is complicated has not been sufficient to justify overriding a prosecutor's
withholding of consent to a requested waiver. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796,
799 n.1 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970); United States v. Pante-
leakis, 422 F. Supp. 247, 249 (D.R.I. 1976); see United States v. Caldarazzo, 444
F.2d 1046, 1050 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971). It appears that factual
issues must go beyond the normal range of difficulty of criminal prosecutions to
justify a waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 491 F.2d 942, 945 (6th Cir.)
(entrapment defense not too complicated for the jury), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 862
(1974); United States v. Mayr, 350 F. Supp. 1291, 1294 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (novel
conspiracy charge well within province of jury capability), aff'd, 487 F.2d 67 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 914 (1974). A defendant may request waiver in
complicated cases, however, because "the judge's greater experience is expected to
enable him to perceive a weakness ... which might escape the perception of a jury."
Bond, The Maryland Practice of Trying Criminal Cases by Judges Alone, Without
Juries, 11 A.B.A. J. 699, 702 (1925). This Note assumes that the judge would be able
to understand complex issues which a jury could not be expected to comprehend. For
a discussion of the right to a jury trial in complicated federal civil cases, see supra
note 8.
22. In Brief for Appellant, United States v. Moon, No. 82-1275 (2d Cir.), the
appellant argues that he was forced to choose between knowledgeable jurors who
would be prejudiced against him, and those who were not prejudiced against him but
who were ill-equipped to decide the case, the issues being complicated. Id. at 21-24,
27-29.
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particularly heinous crime, a jury may not be able to decide the case
without bringing preconceived notions into consideration.2 3
Many federal courts, however, have required the defendant to
prove actual jury prejudice to override the prosecutorial veto on con-
stitutional grounds. For example, some courts have required the de-
fendant to establish that "the selection of a fair and impartial jury is
foreclosed"2 4 or to prove "the actual existence of [a biased] opinion in
the mind of [a] juror. '2 5 Others have denied requests for waiver
because the defendant failed to produce concrete evidence that a fair
trial could not be obtained.2 6 Many other courts have summarily
dismissed the defendant's request for a bench trial once the prosecutor
withheld consent. 27
Such a stringent standard of proof prevents adequate protection of
the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial because a jury may
in fact be biased although the defendant cannot prove it. The Su-
preme Court in Irvin v. Dowd 28 recognized this when it reversed a
conviction on the ground that the jury did not provide the defendant
with a fair trial, 2 9 even though "each juror was sincere when he said
23. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); Bond, supra note 21, at 702;
see, e.g., State v. Hoskins, 292 Minn. 111, 114-16, 193 N.W.2d 802, 806-08 (1972);
People v. Bishop, 46 Misc. 2d 213, 213, 258 N.Y.S.2d 950, 951 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965);
cf. Donnelly, supra note 7, at 254-55 (waivers are desirable in prosecutions under the
Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976), because juries are potentially hostile); Govern-
ment Consent to Waiver, supra note 7, at 1037-38 (same).
24. United States v. Daniels, 282 F. Supp. 360, 362 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (citation
omitted); accord United States v. Stone, 444 F. Supp. 1254, 1257 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd
mem., 588 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Harris, 314 F. Supp. 437, 439
(D. Minn. 1970).
25. United States v. Ceja, 451 F.2d 399, 401 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (quot-
ing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1878)); accord United States v.
Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 187 (4th Cir. 1975).
26. See United States v. Caldarazzo, 444 F.2d 1046, 1050 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); State v. Kilburn, 304 Minn. 217, 225-26, 231 N.W.2d
61, 65-66 (1975). In Kilburn, the defendant, a black man charged with murdering a
fifteen-year old white girl during a sexual encounter, sought to waive his right to ajury on the ground that a jury would be biased against him. Id. at 231-33, 231
N.W.2d at 69. The trial judge acknowledged that it was unlikely that any prospec-
tive jurors would be black. Id. at 221, 231 N.W.2d at 63. In addition, there was
considerable publicity concerning the crime in local newspapers and on television.
Id. The defendant's request for a waiver was denied, however, because there was no
concrete evidence indicating that a fair trial could not be obtained. Id. at 226, 231
N.W.2d at 66.
27. E.g., United States v. Wright, 491 F.2d 942, 945 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 862 (1974); United States v. Farries, 459 F.2d 1057, 1060-61 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied at 409 U.S. 888 (1972) and at 410 U.S. 912 (1973); United States v.
Hilbrich, 341 F.2d 555, 558 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941 (1965); United
States v. Barber, 297 F. Supp. 917, 923 (D. Del. 1969).
28. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
29. Id. at 727-29.
[Vol. 51
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that he would be fair and impartial. ' 30 The Court, however, has
generally relied on the procedural devices available to the trial judge
to overcome any juror prejudice. 31
B. Inadequate Safeguards of Jury Impartiality
In Singer v. United States, 32 the Supreme Court acknowledged that
"trial by jury has its weaknesses and the potential for misuse. ' 33 On
the other hand, the Court relied on the availability of voir dire to
detect prejudice 34 and the right to change venue when voir dire is
insufficient to eliminate prejudice. 35 Although these procedural mech-
anisms enhance the likelihood of fairness of a jury trial, their avail-
ability does not justify the denial of a requested waiver if a reasonable
likelihood of jury bias would remain.
The effectiveness of voir dire depends on many factors, such as the
ability of the attorney36 to elicit prejudice. 37 Additionally, veniremen
30. Id. at 728. In Irvin, the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. Id. at 718. He requested a change of venue, contending that the massive
prejudicial publicity foreclosed the impaneling of an impartial jury. Id. at 719-20.
The lower court had denied the defendant's request because one change in venue
from the county where the offense was allegedly committed had already been
granted and the state permitted only one such change. Id. at 720. The defendant's
motions for continuances had also been denied. Id.
31. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
32. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
33. Id. at 35; accord Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 188-89 (1968) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
34. See 380 U.S. at 35. Rule 24 governs voir dire. Voir dire may be conducted by
"the defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the government." Fed. R. Crim.
P. 24(a). If the court conducts the examination, "the court shall permit the [counsel
for both sides] to supplement the examination by ... further inquiry." Id. A juror
who either fails to meet the statutory qualifications in 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1976 &
Supp. V 1981), or is found to be biased, will be excused. 2 C. Wright, supra note 1, §
383, at 361. Peremptory challenges are governed by Rule 24(b). Fed. R. Grim. P.
24(b).
35. See 380 U.S. at 35. As provided in Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(a), the district court
judge must grant a defendant's request for a change in venue when "there exists...
so great a prejudice against the defendant that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial
trial." A change of venue is also permitted in the court's discretion under Fed. R.
Grim. P. 21(b) if it would facilitate the convenience of the parties and witnesses and
serve the interests of justice. United States v. McGregor, 503 F.2d 1167, 1169 (8th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926 (1975); United States v. Phillips, 433 F.2d
1364, 1368 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 917 (1971).
The defendant may also seek a continuance. Continuances, however, are only
effective if the bias against the defendant will abate. See Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400
U.S. 505 (1971). Continuances are contrary to the defendant's right to a speedy trial.
Id. See supra note 1.
36. Voir dire might be conducted by the judge alone. See United States v.
Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 187 (4th Cir. 1975). See supra note 34.
37. Government Consent to Waiver, supra note 7, at 1037; see Abramovsky,
Juror Safety: The Presumption of Innocence and Meaningful Voir Dire in Federal
Criminal Prosecutions-Are They Endangered Species?, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 30, 47
(1981).
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may not admit conscious prejudices, 3 and unconscious bias is difficult
to detect. 39 Moreover, a growing recognition of the privacy rights of
veniremen 40 has restricted the permissible scope of voir dire inquiry, 4'
thus further limiting the ability of counsel to elicit prejudice. 42 There-
fore, evidence of jury bias may well escape the voir dire efforts of the
defendant's attorney.43
38. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 176 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting);
Note, Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965)-Inability to Waive Jury Trial in
the Federal Courts, 60 Nw. U.L. Rev. 722, 728 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Inability
to Waive]; Government Consent to Waiver, supra note 7, at 1037; Hunt, Putting
Juries on the Couch, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 82, cols. 3-4; see
United States v. Abbott Labs., 505 F.2d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 990 (1975); State v. Kilburn, 304 Minn. 217, 232, 231 N.W.2d 61, 69 (1975)
(Otis, J., dissenting).
39. Donnelly, supra note 7, at 248; Inability to Waive, supra note 38, at 728;
Government Consent to Waiver, supra note 7, at 1037; see Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501, 518-19 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Crawford v. United States, 212
U.S. 183 (1909), the Supreme Court stated: "Bias or prejudice is such an elusive
condition of the mind that it is most difficult, if not impossible, to always recognize
its existence, and it might exist in the mind of one... who was quite positive that he
had no bias, and said that he was perfectly able to decide the question wholly
uninfluenced by anything but the evidence." Id. at 196.
40. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 140 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 907 (1980); id. at 168 n.4 (Meskill, J., dissenting). In Barnes, the Second
Circuit upheld the trial judge's decision to prohibit inquiry into the names, addresses
and ethnic backgrounds of the prospective jurors to avoid violation of their right to
privacy. Id. at 140-41. But see Lehman v. City of San Francisco, 80 Cal. App. 3d
309, 313-14, 145 Cal. Rptr. 493, 494-95 (1978) (disclosure of venireman's identity
does not violate federal or state constitutional right to privacy). See generally The
Defendant's Right to an Impartial Jury and the Rights of Prospective Jurors, 48 U.
Cinn. L. Rev. 985 (1979) (discussion whether sophisticated voir dire techniques and
pretrial investigations violate the privacy rights of prospective jurors). One commen-
tator has stated that cases prior to Barnes do not support the establishment of a right
to jury privacy, but rather "stand for the proposition that vior dire should be limited
to questions which are reasonably related to the issues in the case." Abramovsky,
supra note 37, at 56.
41. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 143 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 907 (1980).
42. Id. at 171-74 (Meskill, J., dissenting); see Abramovsky, supra note 37, at 54-
55. In addition, certain limitations on the interrogator's questions during voir dire
may actually enhance juror bias by impliedly depicting the defendant as a notorious
individual who is so dangerous that anonymity is required to protect the jurors and
their families. Id. at 35.
43. But see Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 511-12 (1948) (suggesting that
bias escapes detection during voir dire only in rare circumstances). In determining
whether a lower court erred in finding no jury prejudice, some courts have limited
their scope of inquiry to responses actually made during voir dire. See United States
v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 187 (4th Cir. 1975) (determination whether juror partial-
ity resulted from pretrial publicity made by looking solely at voir dire record); United
States v. Ceja, 451 F.2d 399, 402 (1st Cir. 1971) (based on voir dire record, request
for waiver denied despite the existence of conflicting evidence). But see Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961) (Court reversed conviction due to jury prejudice
even though each juror had said he would be impartial).
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Similarly, a change in venue 44 increases the likelihood of a fair jury
trial only in limited circumstances. 45 While a venue change may be
sufficient if bias is limited to a particular locality, 4 it would not be
sufficient to counter widespread prejudice47 or prejudice that is not
geographically based. 48 Even when a change in venue would ensure a
fair trial, a bench trial may be preferable. The venire from which the
jury will be picked will not be a "cross-section of the community" in
which the offense was allegedly committed. 49 It may be more fair for
the defendant to be tried by the judge rather than by a jury that does
not have the same social values as the members of the community
where the offense was allegedly committed.50 Moreover, changing
44. A defendant seeking a change in venue waives his constitutional right pro-
vided in U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.3, to be tried in the state where the offense was
committed. See Ranney, Remedies for Prejudicial Publicity: A Brief Review, 21 Viii.
L. Rev. 819, 829-30 (1976).
45. Moreover, courts have been extremely reluctant to grant motions for a
change in venue. United States v. Means, 409 F. Supp. 115, 117 (D.N.D. 1976);
United States v. Marcello, 280 F. Supp. 510, 515 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 423 F.2d
993 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 959 (1970); 2 C. Wright, supra note 1, § 341, at
244; Government Consent to Waiver, supra note 7, at 1035 n.26. For a criticism of
the courts' reluctance to grant such motions, see Note, The Efficacy of a Change of
Venue in Protecting a Defendant's Right to an Impartial Jury, 42 Notre Dame Law.
925, 942 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Efficacy of a Change of Venue].
46. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-27 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 727-28 (1961); Pamplin v. Mason, 364 F.2d 1, 4-5 (5th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Marcello, 280 F. Supp. 510, 515 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 423 F.2d 993 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 959 (1970); United States v. Hoffa, 205 F. Supp. 710,
722 (S.D. Fla.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 892 (1962).
47. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 226 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S.
494 (1951); Donnelly, supra note 7, at 248; see United States v. Mitchell, 372 F.
Supp. 1239, 1261-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (change of venue denied in light of the nation-
wide impact of the Watergate conspiracy), appeal dismissed, 485 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir.
1973). For an example of pretrial publicity creating national notoriety, see Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535-36 (1965).
48. See Ranney, supra note 44, at 829; Government Consent to Waiver, supra
note 7, at 1036.
49. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance that the venire represent
a cross-section of the community where the offense was committed. E.g., Smith v.
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 226 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Ballard v. United States,
329 U.S. 187, 191 (1946) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942)). A
commentator has suggested that the jury selection process currently employed results
in juries that do not represent a "cross-section" of the community because they fail to
adequately represent various groups within the community. Abramovsky, supra note
37, at 43-47.
50. Moreover, any public interest in the fairness that a jury trial affords, see infra
pt. II(C), is less compelling when the jury does not represent members of the
community most concerned about the case. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
187 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that jury trials foster community involve-
ment, responsibility and confidence in the judicial system); United States v. Means,
409 F. Supp. 115, 117 (D.N.D. 1976) ("The interest of a community that those
charged with violations of its laws, be tried in that community, is not a matter to be
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venue entails added costs and inconveniences that can be avoided by
waiver.51
The Supreme Court has stated that "our criminal justice system
permits, and even encourages, trial judges to be overcautious in ensur-
ing that a defendant will receive a fair trial."52 Because these safe-
guards may not adequately protect a defendant from jury prejudice,
waivers should be granted more readily. If the defendant shows a
reasonable likelihood that a jury could not be fair, he should be
permitted to waive his right to a jury trial. 53
II. PROSECUTORIAL VE7o
A literal interpretation of Rule 23(a) indicates that the defendant
cannot waive his right to a jury trial without the express consent of the
prosecutor. 54 This Rule, however, was not designed to give the prose-
cutor the power to veto such requests. The Rule, which was enacted in
1946, 5 is an embodiment of the then-existing practice endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Patton v. United States.5 6 In upholding the consti-
cast aside lightly."); Efficacy of a Change of Venue, supra note 45, at 942 ("[A]dmin-
istration of criminal law is primarily the concern of the community in which the
crime is committed.").
51. Efficacy of a Change of Venue, supra note 45, at 942.
52. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379 n.6 (1979). The Court was
referring to closure of pretrial proceedings when the defendant's right to a fair trial is
endangered by adverse publicity. Id. at 378-79. The Court reasoned that because
reversal of a conviction is such an extreme remedy, trial judges should act to ensure
that the defendant receives a fair trial. Id. at 379 n.6.
53. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 5, United States v. Moon, No. 82-1275 (2d
Cir.); cf. People v. Diaz, 10 A.D.2d 80, 92, 198 N.Y.S.2d 27, 39 ("[I]t is quite
appropriate to grant a waiver against the possible infection of a jury by public
outrage and clamor in the midst of a wave of crime or other inflammatory stim-
uli .... ) (emphasis added), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 1061, 170 N.E.2d 411, 207 N.Y.S.2d
278 (1960). It has been held that a showing of a reasonable likelihood of jury
prejudice entitles the defendant to a change of venue to protect his constitutional
right to a fair trial. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966); United States
v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182, 1187 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977);
see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721 (1961); United States v. Farries, 459 F.2d 1057,
1060-61 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied at 409 U.S. 888 (1972) and at 410 U.S. 912
(1973); United States v. Marcello, 280 F. Supp. 510, 513-14 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd,
423 F.2d 993 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 959 (1970).
54. Brief for Appellee at 61-63, United States v. Moon, No. 82-1275 (2d Cir.).
55. 6 New York University School of Law Institute, Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure iii (1946) [hereinafter cited as Institute Proceedings].
56. 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a) comment. Prior to
Patton, the defendant was not permitted to waive because the jurisdiction of a court
depended on a verdict being rendered by a jury. See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S.
343, 353-55 (1898); cf. Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 135-39 (1858) (state court
jurisdiction conditioned on jury trial). The defendant in Patton sought to waive his
right to a 12-person jury when one juror became ill and could not continue to serve.
281 U.S. at 286. Although the defendant would be tried by a jury, albeit an 11-
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tutionality of jury waivers, the Patton decision focused on the defend-
ant's right to waive a jury trial-not the prosecutorial consent require-
ment.5 7 The Court added, however, that to safeguard the interests of
the defendant 5 and the public, 59 the consent of both the prosecutor
and the court shall be required. 60 The Court, however, emphasized
the role of the judge in guarding these interests. 6 1
Rule 23(a) does include Patton's reference to prosecutorial consent
to requested waivers, and the Rule was upheld in 1965 by the Su-
preme Court in Singer v. United States.62 The Singer Court noted that
there is no constitutional infirmity in requiring such consent if the
defendant receives a fair trial.6 3 But because this veto power severely
reduces the defendant's ability to waive his right to a jury trial, 6 4 the
justifications advanced for this power warrant examination.
A. The Absence of a Right to Waive at Common Law
The Singer Court relied on the absence of a historical right to
choose between a bench and jury trial to justify the limitations on jury
waivers. 5 The absence of a historical right, however, does not war-
person jury, the Court viewed waiver of one juror as waiver of the right to a jury
trial. Id. at 292. In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942), the
Court cited Patton with approval and upheld the constitutionality of jury waivers by
pro se defendants. Id. at 277-78, 280-81.
57. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). The prosecutor in Patton
had in fact consented to waiver of a 12-person jury. Id. at 286.
58. See id. at 312; see also Inability to Waive, supra note 38, at 724 ("the
requirement of obtaining the government's consent was only to protect an uniformed
defendant from waiving his right to a trial by jury") (emphasis in original); Com-
ment, The Government's Interest as a Party Litigant in Federal Criminal Proceed-
ings, 26 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 767, 771 (1965) ("[n]othing in the [Patton] opinion indicates
that the Government has an interest in the jury other than in protecting the defend-
ant") [hereinafter cited as Government's Interest as a Party Litigant]. The impor-
tance of protecting the accused at the time of Patton was magnified by the fact that
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), which held that the sixth amendment
requires a court to appoint counsel for the accused, id. at 462-63, had not yet been
decided. Thus, the government's attorney might be the only counsel present to
protect the defendant from unwise waivers. Inability to Waive, supra note 38, at 724
n.11.
59. See 281 U.S. at 312. See infra pt. II(C). However, the Patton Court rejected
the argument that public policy should be grounds to deny the defendant the power
to waive. 281 U.S. at 308.
60. 281 U.S. at 312.
61. See id. at 312-13.
62. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
63. Id. at 36.
64. See supra note 18.
65. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 26 (1965). But see Griswold, The
Historical Development of Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 20 Va. L. Rev.
655, 660 (1934) (evidence of jury waivers is traceable to the period prior to the
American Revolution).
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rant a severe limitation on waivers. As the Singer Court recognized,
no rational alternatives to jury trials were available at early common
law.66 Moreover, the right to a jury trial both at early common law
and under the Constitution existed only for the benefit of the defend-
ant, to protect him against arbitrary prosecutions.6 7 The traditional
basis of the right to a jury trial does not support the view that waivers
should rarely be granted. Indeed, the fact that this right was designed
to benefit the defendant6" lends support to the adoption of a standard
that provides for waivers more readily.
66. See 380 U.S. at 27 ("At its inception, [trial by jury] was an alternative to...
trial by compurgation, ordeal or battle."); People v. Scornavache, 347 Ill. 403, 405-
06, 179 N.E. 909, 910 (1932), overruled on other grounds, People v. Spegal, 5 Ill. 2d
211, 125 N.E.2d 468 (1955); Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 697; Criminal Jury Trials
in Iowa, supra note 10, at 188. In trial by compurgation, or trial by wager of law,
the defendant was required to obtain sworn testimony of his trustworthiness from
eleven of his neighbors or be convicted. Black's Law Dictionary 1349 (rev. 5th ed.
1979). In trial by ordeal, an accused was tortured until there was "supernatural
intervention," the belief being that an innocent person would be rescued while a
guilty one would not. Id. at 988. In trial by wager of battle, the accused and accuser
would fight and it was believed that Heaven would give the victory to the one in the
right. Id. at 1416.
Moreover, the absence of such a historical right does not support limiting waivers
because, as the Singer Court noted, "[t]he origin of trial by jury in England is not
altogether clear." 380 U.S. at 27; accord Commonwealth v. Rowe, 257 Mass. 172,
176, 153 N.E. 537, 539 (1926). Also, trial by the court was "the very thing that the
accused did not want, [and thus] it is not the least helpful to look for evidence
supporting such a right in the history." Hall, Has the State a Right to Trial by Jury in
Criminal Cases?, 18 A.B.A. J. 226, 227 (1932).
67. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968); Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276, 296-97 (1930); Hall, supra note 66, at 227; Oppenheim, supra note 3,
at 702; Government Consent to Waiver, supra note 7, at 1043; 13 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
189, 193 (1965); see Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 821 (1st Cir. 1908), cert.
dismissed, 213 U.S. 92 (1909); Commonwealth v. Rowe, 257 Mass. 172, 176, 153
N.E. 537, 539 (1926); Note, The Petty Offense Exception and the Right to a Jury
Trial, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 205, 209 & n.39 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Petty Offense
Exception].
68. The right to trial by jury has often been referred to as the defendant's
privilege. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 296-97 (1930); Commonwealth v.
Rowe, 257 Mass. 172, 174, 153 N.E. 537, 538 (1926); People v. Diaz, 10 A.D.2d 80,
92, 198 N.Y.S.2d 27, 39, aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 1061, 170 N.E.2d 411, 207 N.Y.S.2d 278
(1960); Griswold, supra note 65, at 656-57; Hall, supra note 66, at 226; Oppenheim,
supra note 3, at 701-07; see Kuhlman, Pontikes & Stevens, Jury Trial, Progress, and
Democracy, 14 J. Mar. L. Rev. 679, 698 (1980); 26 Ill. L. Rev. 85, 87 (1931). Absent
overriding policy considerations, a person should be able to waive any right that is in
the nature of a privilege. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 72 (1904); Dickinson
v. United States, 159 F. 801, 819 (1st Cir. 1908) (quoting Schick v. United States, 195
U.S. 65 (1904)); Scott v. McCaffrey, 12 Misc. 2d 671, 676, 172 N.Y.S.2d 954, 960
(Sup. Ct. 1958); Hoffman v. State, 98 Ohio St. 137, 146-47, 120 N.E. 234, 236
(1918). The defendant may waive many other constitutional safeguards without
government consent. 3 Orfield Criminal Procedure Under The Federal Rules § 23:41,
at 65 (1966); see, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938) (sixth amend-
ment right to counsel); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931) (fifth
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B. The Integrity of the Prosecutor
In Singer, the requirement of prosecutorial consent was also upheld
on the ground that the government, as a litigant, has an interest in
having cases tried before a jury because "the Constitution regards [the
jury] as most likely to produce a fair result."6 9 The Court stated that
the prosecutor is not required to set forth his reasons for withholding
consent, relying on his integrity as a "servant of the law." 70
Although the prosecutor indeed has a special duty to protect the
rights of the accused and to ensure that fair verdicts are reached, 71 he
is nonetheless an adversary.72 The Supreme Court has consistently
acknowledged that the adversary system protects the public interest in
the administration of justice.73 Although both the prosecutor and the
defendant have an interest in the mode of trial, the requirement of
prosecutorial consent accords the prosecutor the final say over
whether a requested waiver will be granted. Granting the prosecution
this power without requiring him to justify his position is contrary to
the adversary system. Although the prosecutor may have a legitimate
interest in having cases tried before a jury,74 this interest does not
amendment protection against self-incrimination), overruled on other grounds sub
nom., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1964); Trono v. United
States, 199 U.S. 521, 533-34 (1905) (fifth amendment right to protection against
double jeopardy); Worthington v. United States, 1 F.2d 154, 154 (7th Cir. 1924)
(sixth amendment right to a speedy trial). See generally Oppenheim, supra note 3, at
702-03 (constitutional safeguards may be unilaterally waived because they exist to
protect the person seeking waiver).
69. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965). The defendant's constitu-
tional right to a fair trial is not violated if he is forced to have a jury trial, provided it
is a fair one. See id.; Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) ("[a]
defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one") (quoting Lutwak v. United
States, 344 U.S. 609, 619 (1953).
70. 380 U.S. at 37 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
71. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); accord 1 ABA Standards,
supra note 14, 3-1.1 ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to
convict."). The prosecutor's duty extends to protecting the rights of the accused,
National District Attorneys Ass'n, National Prosecution Standards 26.1 (1977), and
the interests of the community, see F. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a
Suspect with a Crime 4 (1969). See generally D. Nissman & E. Hagen, The Prosecu-
tion Function (1982) (discussion on the prosecutor's function in the legal system).
72. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 32 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see
Inability to Waive, supra note 38, at 728; Government's Interest as a Party Litigant,
supra note 58, at 770.
73. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979); Singer v. United
States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965); see Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,
28 (1981). The Supreme Court, however, has also recognized that the adversary
system is not perfect. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 328 (1979)
("neither judges, the parties, nor the adversary system performs perfectly in all
cases") (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. University Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329
(1971)).
74. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965). But see Hall, supra note 66,
at 227 (no right or interest in jury trial exists apart from protection of accused). States
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justify granting him an absolute veto power. Both the defendant and
the prosecutor should instead be required to set forth their reasons for
seeking a particular mode of trial before the judge, thus making the
judge, rather than the prosecutor, the ultimate arbiter.
C. The Public Interest Theory
In Patton v. United States,75 the Supreme Court stated that the
maintenance of the jury in criminal cases is of "such importance and
has such a place in our traditions" that before the defendant can
waive his right to a jury trial, the prosecutor must consent.7 6 Con-
versely, some states view this public interest as requiring only that
waivers are knowingly and intelligently made,7 7 thereby providing the
defendant with the opportunity for a jury trial7 without imposing it
upon him.
79
Trial by jury is undoubtedly a "security in which the public at large
as well as the individual have a concern."8 ° Because juries resolve
"factual issues by group deliberation rather than by the decision of a
single judge," 8' trial by jury arguably increases the chances for a
correct verdict.8 2 The public may have more confidence in the crimi-
nal justice system when cases are decided by a jury.8 3 Because the jury
system may protect the accused from an unjustified conviction, 4 the
public "has an interest in protecting its citizens, even in cases where
that have adopted a unilateral approach to jury trials have not recognized any
prosecutorial interest in jury trials. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, 103-6 (Smith-
Hurd 1980) (defendant has right to waive in open court "understandingly"); La.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 780 (West 1980) (absolute right to waive in non-capital
cases, provided waiver is knowingly and intelligently made).
75. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
76. Id. at 312. The Supreme Court did not discuss this public interest in Singer v.
United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965). The belief that this public interest may justify
imposing a jury trial on the defendant is not universally held. See People v. Spegal, 5
Ill. 2d 211, 222, 125 N.E.2d 468, 473 (1955) ("That the custom of trying criminal
cases by jury gave rise to a right in the People to object to a trial by the court upon
waiver of a jury trial by the accused may well be doubted."). See infra notes 77-79
and accompanying text, pt. III(A).
77. E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, 103-6 (Smith-Hurd 1980); La. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 780 (West 1981); see Donnelly, supra note 7, at 255. See supra note
10.
78. See supra note 1.
79. See infra pt. III(A).
80. Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 708.
81. Petty Offense Exception, supra note 67, at 210 & n.41.
82. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev.
386, 389 (1954); Joiner, From the Bench, in The Jury System in America 146-47 (R.
Simon ed. 1975); see Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 103-06 (1895).
83. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 187-88 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Petty Offense Exception, supra note 67, at 210-11; see State v. Kilburn, 304 Minn.
217, 229-31, 231 N.W.2d 61, 67-68 (1975) (Otis, J., dissenting).
84. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 106-07 (1895).
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the individual refuses that protection." 8 5 As the Court in Patton recog-
nized, this public interest must be guarded "jealously."8' 6 This interest
may, however, be outweighed by other public interests. 87 For exam-
ple, although a guilty plea involves a waiver of the right to trial by
jury, the Supreme Court has recognized that the interest in trying
cases before a jury is outweighed by the benefits provided by such
pleas. 8
The prosecutorial veto may prevent the furtherance of other impor-
tant public interests. Delay in the disposition of cases has long been a
major problem in the court system.89 A case tried before a jury gener-
ally takes much longer than one tried before a judge.90 Also, when the
defendant asserts that an impartial jury could not be found, the
impaneling of a jury may require a substantial amount of time.9'
Trials by the court may eliminate many time-consuming rulings on
85. 3 ABA Standards, supra note 14, 15-1.2(a) commentary at 15"19; see People
ex rel. Rohrlich v. Follette, 20 N.Y.2d 297, 300-02, 229 N.E.2d 419, 420-22, 282
N.Y.S.2d 729, 731-33 (1967); Inability to Waive, supra note 38, at 728; Govern-
ment's Interest as a Party Litigant, supra note 58, at 771.
86. 281 U.S. at 312.
87. Although there are policy concerns that may be furthered by a waiver, they
do not justify limiting the accused's right to a jury trial. See supra note 1. Rather,
they weaken the argument that jury trials are always in the public interest.
88. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 276 (1942); Patton
v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 305-06 (1930). The Supreme Court has recognized the
benefits of plea bargaining. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
89. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 134-35 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 188 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Su-
preme Court has stated that "[t]he public ... has a definite and concrete interest in
seeing that justice is swiftly and fairly administered." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972)). The
jury has been criticized as an "expensive, cumbersome, and time-wasting institu-
tion." Donnelly, supra note 7, at 256; accord Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
189 & n.39 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Note, Waiver of Jury Trials in Felony
Cases, 20 Cal. L. Rev. 132, 132 (1932); Petty Offense Exception, supra note 67, at
208.
In 1974, Congress passed the Speedy Trial Act, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 18 U.S.C. §§
3161-3174 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), making time considerations a major factor in
judicial decision-making. The Act requires that trials be commenced within seventy
days of arraignment or the case must be dismissed. Id. §§ 3161(c)(1), 3162(2). In
United States v. Braunstein, 474 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.J. 1979), the court viewed this Act
as encouraging bench trials. See id. at 14. The court reasoned that if it takes longer to
try a case before a jury than before the court, "in a substantial sense [a trial by jury]
necessarily affects adversely the rights of other defendants and of the public, to have
other cases tried within the limits set by the Act." Id. (emphasis in original); see
United States v. Engleman, 489 F. Supp. 48, 50 (E.D. Mo. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 648 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1981).
90. United States v. Braunstein 474 F. Supp. 1, 14 (D.N.J. 1979); see Bond,
supra note 21, at 702; Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 737; First Report of the Judicial
Council of Massachusetts, 11 Mass. L.Q. 7, 24 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Judicial
Council of Massachusetts].
91. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 720 (1961) (four weeks); Brief for Appellant
at 21 n.30, United States v. Moon, No. 82-1275 (2d Cir.) (seven days).
1983] 1105
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the admissibility of evidence that would be potentially prejudicial if
heard by a jury.92 Reducing the length of a trial will lower the costs of
court security, legal services and support personnel. 3 Expenses result-
ing from hung juries and mistrials can also be avoided.9 4
Trial by jury "should at all times function in harmony with newer
and ever changing social interests." 95 To allow accommodation of all
interests affected by waiver-not only those guarded by the prosecu-
tor-the prosecutorial veto power should be eliminated. Rather, the
judge should consider the relevant interests of the defendant, the
prosecutor and the public, and should be able to override a prosecu-
tor's refusal to consent to a requested waiver even if the defendant's
right to a fair trial is not endangered.
III. ALTERNATIVE PRACIricEs
The few federal courts that have granted a requested waiver over
the prosecutor's refusal to consent96 are dissatisfied with the current
stringent standard for waiver. One court has stated that the prosecu-
tor's refusal to consent may be overridden even though the defendant's
right to a fair trial is not violated.97 Two other federal courts have
suggested that a prosecutor's refusal to consent should be upheld only
if reasonable. 98 Furthermore, many states do not require prosecutorial
92. 26 111. L. Rev. 85, 88 (1931); see Bond, supra note 21, at 703.
93. See Judicial Council of Massachusetts, supra note 90, at 25-26; Cost of Jury
Trials, 130 New L.J. 412, 412-13 (1980); New York Judicial Council, Recommenda-
tion of the Judicial Council to Permit Waiver of Jury Trials in Criminal Non-Capital
Cases, in 2d Annual Report 95, 101 (1936) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Judicial Coun-
cil]. In determining whether a bench trial would further public interests, cost consid-
erations are very significant in "today's high cost, inflationary economy." United
States v. Braunstein, 474 F. Supp. 1, 13 (D.N.J. 1979).
94. N.Y. Judicial Council, supra note 93, at 101. It has also been suggested that
jury waivers reduce the number of appeals. Id.
95. Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 712.
96. See supra note 18.
97. United States v. Braunstein, 474 F. Supp. 1, 12, 14 (D.N.J. 1979).
98. See United States v. Panteleakis, 422 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D.R.I. 1976); United
States v. Schipani, 44 F.R.D. 461, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) aff'd on other grounds, 414
F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970). Another court has
suggested that evidence of bad faith may be sufficient grounds to override the
prosecutor's refusal to consent to waiver. United States v. Mayr, 350 F. Supp. 1291,
1294 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 914
(1974). In Schipani, the government had originally consented to the defendant's
waiver of the jury. 44 F.R.D. at 461. On appeal of the defendant's conviction, the
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.
Schipani v. United States, 385 U.S. 372 (1966) (per curiam). Upon commencement of
the second trial, the prosecution sought to withdraw its consent to the waiver. 44
F.R.D. at 462. The court denied the request, holding that the refusal was "unreason-
able" without stating whether its denial was based on the dicta in Singer v. United
States, 380 U.S. 24, 37-38 (1965), see supra note 14 and accompanying text, or
because the prosecution had originally consented, see 44 F.R.D. at 463. The notion
that the prosecutor should be held to a reasonableness standard in withholding
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consent to waivers, °9 rejecting the asserted justifications for the re-
quirement. 00 Some states permit the defendant to waive a jury trial
unilaterally without setting forth any reasons,' 0 ' while other states
permit waiver only upon court approval.10 2 Analysis of these ap-
proaches suggests a standard that satisfies the objections to the federal
rule.
A. Unilateral Waiver by the Defendant
States that permit the defendant to choose between a bench and
jury trial rely on the assumption that the right to a jury trial exists
solely for the protection of the accused.' 0 3 The only public interest
recognized is ensuring that waivers are knowingly and voluntarily
made. 04 Jury trials, however, generally further other legitimate pub-
lic interests. 0 5 The unilateral waiver approach should not be adopted
in the federal courts because it fails to recognize that legitimate public
interests may justify overriding requested waivers. Furthermore, the
unilateral approach gives the defendant a procedural advantage'06 by
not recognizing that the prosecutor has a legitimate interest in the
mode of trial and is also entitled to have his interests considered.
B. Waiver upon Court Approval
Waiver has also been conditioned upon court approval.' 0 7 Many
states give the court wide discretion in determining whether to grant a
consent to a defendant's requested waiver of a jury is not novel. See 8A J. Moore,
supra note 2, § 23.03(2), at 23-18; Donnelly, supra note 7, at 255; Government
Consent to Waiver, supra note 7, at 1040.
99. See supra note 10.
100. See id. Some courts have expressly rejected the justifications for the require-
ment of prosecutorial consent. People v. Spegal, 5 Ill. 2d 211, 218, 125 N.E.2d 468,
471 (1955) (citations omitted); see Scott v. McCaffrey, 12 Misc. 2d 671, 677, 172
N.Y.S.2d 954, 961-62 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
101. See supra note 10, infra pt. III(A).
102. See infra pt. III(B).
103. See People v. Spegal, 5 Ill. 2d 211, 218, 125 N.E.2d 468, 471 (1955); 3 ABA
Standards, supra note 14, 15-1.2 commentary at 15-21. See supra note 10. In 1918,
the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "If [the defendant] regards it... as a burden, a
hardship, a prejudice to a fair trial, why in the name of reason should he not be
permitted to waive it ... ?" Hoffman v. State, 98 Ohio St. 137, 146-47, 120 N.E.
234, 236 (1918).
104. See Cole v. State, 569 P.2d 470, 472 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (per curiam);
see, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-406 (1973); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, 103-6 (Smith-
Hurd 1980); Md. R. Crim. P. 735.
105. See supra pt. II(C).
106. Criminal Jury Trials in Iowa, supra note 10, at 201. Adoption of a unilateral
waiver approach in federal cases would effectively overrule Singer, which held that a
mere desire to save time does not itself constitute a sufficient reason for justifying a
waiver. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37-38 (1965).
107. See State v. Godfrey, 182 Neb. 451, 458, 155 N.W.2d 438, 443 (waiver
should be granted by the court if "fair, reasonable, and efficient administration of
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requested waiver, 0 allowing consideration of all interests affected by
a waiver. One state has instead limited the court's discretion by
requiring that a waiver be accepted unless "it is tendered as a strata-
gem to procure an otherwise impermissible procedural advantage." 109
Although this rule recognizes that in certain circumstances waivers
should be denied on public policy grounds, "0 it fails to recognize that
other public interests are served by jury trials.' In certain circum-
stances, waivers should be denied even though not tendered for an
improper purpose." 2 This rule also fails to recognize that the prosecu-
tor as a litigant may have legitimate reasons for seeking a jury trial. 11
This rule is therefore not much different from the unilateral ap-
proach.
To allow protection of these interests, the prosecutor should con-
tinue to have a voice in determining whether a requested waiver
justice" will be promoted), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 937 (1968); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§ 320.10(2) (McKinney 1982) (waiver must be granted unless "tendered as a strata-
gem to procure an otherwise impermissible procedural advantage"); Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.01(2) (decision solely within court discretion if waiver is made knowingly and
voluntarily; if case involves potentially prejudicial pretrial publicity, waiver will be
granted if required to ensure likelihood of fair trial). In Massachusetts, waivers may
be granted by the court only if requested before jury impaneling begins. Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 263, § 6 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980). If there is more than one defendant,
all must waive or the court in its discretion may sever the case, and denial is
permitted for "any good and sufficient reason," which must be set forth in the
record. Mass. R. Crim. P. 19.
108. The following statutes and rules do not provide specific guidelines to be
followed by the court in deciding whether to grant a requested waiver. Hawaii Rev.
Stat. § 806-61 (1979); Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.001(2) (1981); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-17-3
(1981); Me. R. Crim. P. 23(a); Mo. R. Crim. P. 27.01(b).
109. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 320.10(2) (McKinney 1982). It has been held that
under this rule, the defendant's request for a waiver should be denied in multi-
defendant actions if waiver would result in a severance of the case. See People v.
Duchin, 12 N.Y.2d 351, 353, 190 N.E.2d 17, 17-18, 239 N.Y.S.2d 670, 671 (1963);
People v. Diaz, 10 A.D.2d 80, 90-91, 198 N.Y.S.2d 27, 38, aff'd mem., 8 N.Y.2d
1061, 170 N.E.2d 411, 207 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1960). But see People v. Pasaro, 79 Misc.
2d 504, 509, 358 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 (Crim. Ct. 1974) (waiver granted despite
resulting severance); Scott v. McCaffrey, 12 Misc. 2d 671, 676, 172 N.Y.S.2d 954,
960 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (waiver should not be denied simply because defendant would
obtain "the severance which, in the discretion of the court, had been denied him").
110. In addition to guarding against the use of waivers to obtain an impermissible
procedural advantage, see supra note 109 and accompanying text, waivers will be
denied if not knowingly and intelligently made. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 320.10(2)
(McKinney 1982); see People v. Davis, 49 N.Y.2d 114, 119, 400 N.E.2d 313, 316, 424
N.Y.S.2d 372, 375 (1979); People ex rel. Rohrlich v. Follette, 20 N.Y.2d 297, 300-01,
229 N.E.2d 419, 421, 282 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731-32 (1967); People v. Duchin, 12 N.Y.2d
351, 353, 190 N.E.2d 17, 18, 239 N.Y.S.2d 670, 671 (1963).
111. See supra pt. II(C).
112. See infra pt. IV.
113. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965). See supra pt. II(B).
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should be granted, and the judge should be afforded sufficient discre-
tion to consider all interests affected by a waiver.
IV. PROCEDURAL APPROACH
If the defendant shows a reasonable likelihood that a jury could not
provide a fair trial, he should have an absolute right to waive his right
to a jury trial. 1 4 In such circumstances, the general public interest in
having trials by jury, as well as any burdens imposed on the public or
the prosecutor by a bench trial, cannot justify denial of a requested
waiver. Moreover, even if the defendant does not assert that a jury
trial would be unfair, the judge should not be required to deny a
requested waiver merely because the prosecutor refuses to consent.
Rather, the judge should weigh the hardships that a jury trial would
impose on the defendant against the interests set forth by the prosecu-
tor.
In United States v. Braunstein,115 a federal district court held that it
was not necessary to decide the case on constitutional grounds," 6 and
granted the defendant's motion to waive the jury over the prosecutor's
refusal to consent.' 1 7 The court found that because the issues involved
were so complex, a jury would not be able to understand the intrica-
cies involved without ongoing guidance, thereby resulting in inordi-
nate delay and expense." 8 The court held that based on the "totality
of the circumstances," the waiver should be granted as a matter of
proceduralfairness. "o The prosecutor's failure to set forth any reasons
for refusing to consent also influenced the court.120
114. See supra pt. I.
115. 474 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.J. 1979).
116. Id. at 14. At least two cases before Braunstein suggested that waiver might be
granted over prosecutorial objection even though the defendant's constitutional right
to a fair trial would not be violated by a jury trial. See United States v. Farries, 459
F.2d 1057, 1061 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied at 409 U.S. 888 (1972) and at 410 U.S.
912 (1973); United States v. Mayr, 350 F. Supp. 1291, 1294 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd,
487 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 914 (1974).
117. 474 F. Supp. at 14. In a supplemental memorandum, the Braunstein court
noted that the case was assigned to another court, which set the case for a jury trial.
Id. at 21. The defendants, however, pleaded guilty before trial began. Id. at 22.
118. Id. at 13-14. The defendant was charged with income tax evasion and
medicaid fraud. Id. at 13. The court noted that a jury trial would require indepen-
dent experts to guide the jury, complicated jury instructions on separate federal and
state laws and potentially confusing rulings on the admissibility of evidence as to
particular defendants. Id. at 13-14. Also, the prosecution planned to introduce
numerous witnesses and intricate exhibits. Id. at 14.
119. Id. at 17.
120. See id. at 14. ("It is the government's right, as recognized in Singer ... to
withhold consent without explanation. However... the government [placed] noth-
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The federal courts should adopt the Braunstein approach. In deter-
mining whether to grant a requested waiver, the judge should con-
sider the specific reasons offered by both parties in favor of or against
waiver. If the defendant offers no reason for seeking a waiver,121
waiver should be denied. The general public interest in preserving the
jury trial is thereby furthered. When the defendant asserts legitimate
reasons for seeking waiver, such as inordinate delay and expense,
however, the court should balance the defendant's interests against
the prosecutor's reasons for withholding consent.
The court should consider the effects waiver will have on public
interests. 12 2 For example, in multi-defendant cases, if fewer than all
the defendants seek waiver, the case may have to be severed if waiver
is granted.12 3 The court is then faced with the additional determina-
tion whether the benefits of waiver to the defendant justify the result-
ing additional expense, delay and security problems. 24
The court should also consider whether a jury has already been
selected. The public interest in avoiding unnecessary time and expend-
itures will not be served by waiver if the jury has already been
selected. 125 Also, the prosecutor must be able to anticipate the mode of
trial when preparing his case; it may be unfair to him as a litigant to
grant a waiver after he has prepared for trial.126 A waiver early in the
ing in the balance other than good reputation and motive to weigh against the
overwhelming showing of sound reasons presented by defendants.").
121. If the defendant merely asserts that he seeks a more simple procedure, waiver
should be denied. Even though Rule 2 of the FRCP directs that the federal rules "be
construed to secure simplicity in procedure," Fed. R. Crim. P. 2, the public interest
in maintaining the jury trial overrides the defendant's desire for a more simple
procedure.
122. See supra pt. II(C).
123. See United States v. Alpern, 564 F.2d 755, 758 (7th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Farries, 459 F.2d 1057, 1061 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied at 409 U.S. 888 (1972)
and at 410 U.S. 912 (1973); United States v. Tyler, 332 F. Supp. 856, 857-58 (E.D.
Wis. 1971).
124. United States v. Farries, 459 F.2d 1057, 1061 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied at
409 U.S. 888 (1972) and at 410 U.S. 912 (1973). But see United States v. Jackson, 549
F.2d 517, 526 (8th Cir.) (defendant argued that security problems at trial could have
been prevented had case been severed), cert. denied at 430 U.S. 985 and at 431 U.S.
923, 968 (1977).
125. Unlike certain state rules, see infra note 127, the federal rule does not require
that waivers be requested at any particular stage of the criminal proceedings. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 23(a). In United States v. Ceja, 451 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1971), the court
noted that to promote judicial efficiency, waivers should be required to be made
before trial begins. Id. at 402 n.2.
126. Criminal Jury Trials in Iowa, supra note 10, at 201. The Federal Rules were
designed to give neither party an undue advantage over the other. Institute Proceed-
ings, supra note 55, at iv ("The new Rules are designed to safeguard both the
government and the defendant against expense and delay. They protect both the
accused and society, but give to neither an undue advantage over the other."). But
see People v. Caldwell, 107 Misc. 2d 62, 65-66, 437 N.Y.S.2d 829, 832 (Sup. Ct.
[Vol. 51
WAIVER OF JURY TRIALS
proceeding, however, allows the prosecutor to prepare his case ac-
cordingly. 127
If the defendant requests a waiver solely on the ground of saving the
time and expense required for a jury trial, the court should determine
the extent of the burdens on the defendant. Jury trials generally entail
more time and expense than bench trials. 28 The general public inter-
est in this mode of trial, however, justifies such burdens. A waiver
should be granted only if the public interest in having jury trials is
outweighed by unusual burdens on the defendant. 2 9 In certain cir-
cumstances, the expense and delay resulting from a jury trial will be so
great that absent overriding public or prosecutorial interests, waiver
should be granted. For example, certain crimes involve issues so com-
plex that a jury could not make an informed decision without ongoing
expert guidance. 30 The expense and delay imposed on the defendant
in such cases may outweigh the general public interest in having the
issues resolved by a jury. The defendant's financial resources should be
considered in making this determination. 3
1980) (fact that waiver was sought during trial did not affect determination of
whether waiver would create unfair procedural advantage).
127. Some state waiver rules expressly include consideration of the timeliness of a
request for waiver. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 263, § 6 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980)
(defendant may be tried by court if court approves and jury has not been impaneled);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 606.7 (1974) (unilateral waiver if prior to impaneling jury);
Iowa R. Crim. P. 16 (1981) (unilateral waiver if requested within 30 days of arraign-
ment; thereafter, consent of the prosecutor is required); Ohio R. Crim. P. 23(a)
(unilateral waiver if requested before trial; thereafter, need consent of both court
and the prosecutor).
128. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
129. Rule 2 of the FRCP counsels that the federal rules be construed to prevent
"unjustifiable expense and delay." Fed. R. Crim. P. 2 (emphasis added); see H.R.
Rep. No. 2492, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. 2 (1940); S. Rep. No. 1934, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. 2
(1940); Institute Proceedings, supra note 55, at iv.
130. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 188-89 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Braunstein, 474 F. Supp. 1, 13 (D.N.J. 1979); United States v.
Panteleakis, 422 F. Supp. 247, 249 (D.R.I. 1976).
131. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
mandates that district courts devise plans for the appointing of counsel for persons
"financially unable to obtain adequate representation." Id.; see United States v.
Dangdee, 608 F.2d 807, 809 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Gipson, 517 F. Supp.
230, 231 (W.D. Mich. 1981). A district court judge is afforded considerable discre-
tion in appointing counsel. United States v. Deutsch, 599 F.2d 46, 49 n.5 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 935 (1979); Jones v. Morris, 590 F.2d 684, 687 (7th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 965 (1979); Wood v. United States, 373 F.2d 894, 900
(5th Cir. 1967); see United States v. Gipson, 517 F. Supp. 230, 231 (W.D. Mich.
1981). Even if a defendant is not "financially unable" to pay for counsel, however,
the legal costs may impose a severe hardship that is magnified by the imposition of a
longer trial. Cf. id. at 231 (fact that defendant had pleaded guilty was relevant in
determining whether he could afford counsel).
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The standard for determining whether to grant the defendant's
requested waiver must be flexible. As the Supreme Court has stated,
"'procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights are not to be treated as
mechanical rigidities."'' 32 Given the precept of Rule 2 of the FRCP
that all the federal rules "be construed to secure simplicity in proce-
dure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay,"'' 33 if the burdens imposed on the defendant are
not overridden by public or prosecutorial interests in having a jury
trial, waiver should be granted.
CONCLUSION
The current rule governing the defendant's ability to waive his
constitutional right to a jury trial in federal criminal cases should be
reexamined. The prosecutor has been given virtually absolute power
to veto requested waivers. This is inconsistent with notions of fair play
and may undermine important interests of the defendant and the
general public. The judge should be the ultimate decision-maker in
determining whether a waiver will be granted.
If the defendant asserts that a jury trial would violate his constitu-
tional right to a fair trial, a waiver should be granted if there is a
reasonable likelihood that a jury would be unable to provide a fair
trial. Because the traditional mechanisms to ensure fairness have not
always been effective, the defendant should not be required to show
actual proof of bias. Moreover, an approach that allows consideration
of all legitimate interests affected by a waiver should be adopted. A
less rigid approach to jury waivers will further the interests of both the
defendant and the public.
Fred Anthony DeCicco
132. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942). The Court
noted that "procedural devices rooted in experience were written into the Bill of
Rights not as abstract rubrics in an elegant code but in order to assure fairness and
justice before any person could be deprived of 'life, liberty or property.' "Id. at 276.
133. Fed. R. Crim. P. 2; see H.R. Rep. No. 2942, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. 2 (1940)
("[T]he enactment of this legislation will promote the uniformity, simplicity, and
flexibility of criminal pleadings, practice, and procedure, and eliminate technicali-
ties and delays in criminal cases.").
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